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COMMENT 
THE UNFOLDING LEGAL DILEMMA CREATED BY 
HONOR AND APOSTASY CRIMES IN THE UNITED 
STATES  
Meredith I. Biggs† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Honor and apostasy crimes have become increasingly prevalent in recent 
years and present the concern of how to effectively deal with them. Both 
crimes share the root of fundamental beliefs and are fueled by hatred and 
prejudice, but they stem from different motivations. Honor crimes are 
motivated by a person’s desire to rid the family name of any shame caused 
by another member. Alternatively, killing an apostate is motivated by the 
desire to rid society of those who oppose a particular religion. While 
sometimes committed for different reasons, killing a family member who 
has converted from the family’s religion could be motivated by both honor 
and apostasy. Moreover, both crimes have been similarly tied to patriarchal 
and fundamentalist societies and are not exclusive to any one culture or 
religion. However, there is an historical and religious link between 
fundamentalist Islam and the crimes of honor and apostasy killings, which 
have become increasingly prevalent in recent years alongside the global 
increase of fundamentalist Islam. Western governments have begun to 
acknowledge that these crimes are no longer limited to a geographic region 
of the world and are in the midst of determining the best method to combat 
them. However, the United States has yet to respond to this new trend, 
which has passed beyond the isolated and distant terror it was and has 
moved into a close and piercing reality. 
In 2009, America watched the drama unfold as a young girl fled cross-
country from a possible but uncertain apostasy killing, only to seek refuge 
in a Florida court. Rifqa, a seventeen-year-old minor, ran from her home in 
Ohio in fear that she would be the victim of an apostasy killing at the hands 
of her parents. Rifqa was born to a Muslim family in Sri Lanka and moved 
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to the United States in 2000.1 After moving to Ohio, her parents became 
very involved in a mosque called the “Noor Islamic Cultural Center,” 
known for its fundamentalist teachings and alleged ties to terrorist cells.2 
However, in 2005 Rifqa converted to Christianity and hid her faith from her 
parents. Her parents eventually discovered her conversion, and in June 
2009, Rifqa escaped to Florida out of fear for her life. Reacting to her 
parents’ alleged threats and fundamentalist beliefs, Rifqa believed that her 
parents would either kill her or send her back to Sri Lanka to be “dealt 
with,” i.e., forced to convert or killed for apostasy.3 Without a legal 
decision, the case went to settlement before the Florida court and Rifqa 
remained in foster care until her eighteenth birthday in 2010. 
Rifqa’s unprecedented story presented a unique challenge to the 
American legal system. Her crisis is exceptional for several reasons: it is 
rare enough that she is a minor and the crime springs from religious and 
ideological beliefs; however, the true phenomenon of her story is its 
preemptive nature and that the ominous possibility of her doom must be 
decidedly authentic or invented if the American legal system is to do 
anything about it. Furthermore, the fact that she is a minor exacerbates the 
dilemma because of her vulnerability due to lack of legal capacity.  
Unfortunately, the laws of this country are unprepared to deal with 
prevention of religious honor killings, which are still a relatively new 
occurrence in this country. Rifqa’s case points to a real problem: at what 
point can the state constitutionally interfere with a parent/child relationship 
in order to prevent a religion-based crime? Is the fact that her parents are 
members of a mosque that has ties to fundamentalist ideology enough? At 
what point do the scales of justice tip from siding with the rights of parents 
to the protection of the child? The looming threat demands an answer, and 
our courts must be prepared to give one in the midst of high controversy 
and political divisiveness over the issue.  
                                                                                                                           
 1. Affadavit [sic] of Rifqa Bary ¶ 2, dated Aug. 30, 2009, filed in In re Fathima Rifqa 
Bary, No. DP09-580 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug., 2009), available at http://orlandolawyer.tv/ 
documents/Rifqa%20Affidavit.pdf (given while fighting a compulsory return to her parents’ 
custody) [hereinafter Bary Affidavit].  
 2. Id. ¶ 5-14, (claiming that Noor Center was picked specifically for its “Original 
Islam” teachings over eight other closer mosques); see Joshua Rhett Miller, Attorney Targets 
Alleged Terror Ties in Case of Runaway Girl, FOXNEWS.COM, (Aug. 31, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,545020,00.html.  
 3. Tim Padgett, A Florida Culture-War Circus Over Rifqa Bary, TIME, Aug. 24, 2009, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1918228,00.html (last visited 
July 2, 2011). 
2011] HONOR AND APOSTASY CRIMES 507 
 
 
This Comment is a modest attempt to answer the question of the state’s 
authority in a preemptive intervention of a minor facing a religion-based 
crime at the hands of her parents. Against that backdrop, it will first explore 
the ties between fundamentalist Islam and honor crimes by discussing the 
historical and religious roots of fundamentalist Islam and honor crimes. 
This Comment will then address the legal problems inherent in preventing 
these crimes and how other governments are responding. Using Rifqa’s 
case as a starting point, this comment will seek to shed light on what 
circumstances must exist to allow a state to step in and prevent a belief-
based killing of a minor by a parent. Because this situation involves the 
exercise of religion, the comment will compare and contrast Rifqa’s 
dilemma with prior state interferences in the Mormon practice of polygamy, 
specifically adjudicated in the case In re Steed, where a mass state 
intervention occurred at the Yearning for Zion Ranch.4 Ultimately, this 
Comment will suggest possible changes to the law that allows courts to 
consider certain prevalent factors in the termination of parental rights.  
II. BACKGROUND: THE LINKS BETWEEN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND 
HONOR AND APOSTASY CRIMES  
A.  Apostasy Killings Are Tied to Fundamentalist Islam  
Apostasy is the denial of or conversion from Islam, and it is a topic that 
breeds controversy both inside and outside the boundaries of the Islamic 
community. Currently, there are two main scholarly approaches to apostasy 
and its consequences under Islamic law. The first is usually classified as a 
fundamentalist or traditional approach. Its proponents point to certain 
verses in the Islamic holy book, the Qur’an, that reflect Allah’s severe 
punishment for those who turn their backs on the religion, including death.5 
The hadith, which are the oral traditions of the life of the Islamic prophet 
Muhammad and are looked to as sources of Islamic law, further support the 
                                                                                                                           
 4. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3625 (Tex. App. May 22, 
2008), aff’d, In re Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008) 
[hereinafter “Yearning for Zion Ranch”]. 
 5. QUR’AN 4:89-90 (command to seize and kill those who blaspheme); 9:5 (command 
to kill polytheists); 9:11-12 (encouragement to fight polytheists); 9:68 (Allah’s punishment 
for hypocrites and unbelievers); 9:73-74 (encouragement to punish unbelievers “harshly”); 
88:23-24 (Allah will torment “he who turns away”). 
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conclusion that Islam prescribes the death sentence for apostates: 
“‘Whoever changed his Islamic religion, then kill him.’”6  
Because apostasy is a crime against the nation state of Islam, it has 
historically been punishable by death in the traditional four schools of 
Islamic law: the Hanafites, Shafi’ites, Malikites, and the Hanbalites.7 The 
predominant differences between these schools of Islamic jurisprudence in 
this matter are the time, place, and procedure to be followed in killing an 
unrepentant apostate.8 Additionally, the traditional schools of law differed 
on treatment of apostate women and minors. Three of the schools would 
punish women with death and only two would do so to minors.9  
B. Apostasy Killings Are Not Tied to Moderate Islam 
Yet those that support the second, more moderate approach, often 
characterized as a “modern” approach, declare that Islam is a religion of 
peace and also point out Qur’anic verses to support this proposition.10 They 
suggest that the verses in the Qur’an commanding death for apostates and 
non-Muslims are only intended to apply to those making war against Allah 
and his people.11 Their rationale is simply that the Qur’anic scripture, when 
taken in its textual and historical context, commands action only in the 
limited circumstance of self-defense.12 This exegetical study of the Qur’an 
is an analytical approach to the study of scripture that determines in what 
circumstances the law was given, in other words focusing on its context, 
rather than taking the literal meaning of the scripture on its face.13 Simply 
                                                                                                                           
 6. 9 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, 84:57 (M. Muhsin Khan trans.) (quoting Muhammad), 
available at http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/ 
hadith/bukhari/084.sbt.html (last visited July 2, 2011). See ABDUL HAMID SIDDIQUE, 
SELECTION FROM HADITH 69, 132 (1993).  
 7. ABDULLA SAEED & HAISAN SAEED, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, APOSTASY AND ISLAM 51 
(2004); see also 5 ABDURRAHMANI’L-DJAZIRI, THE PENALTIES FOR APOSTASY IN ISLAM 
ACCORDING TO THE FOUR SCHOOLS OF ISLAMIC LAW 422-40 (Villach trans., 1997) (1934), 
available at http://www.light-of-life.com/eng/ilaw/ (last visited July 2, 2011).  
 8. ABDURRAHMANI’L-DJAZIRI, supra note 7. 
 9. SAEED supra note 7, at 52, 59.  
 10. “If they incline to peace, incline thou also to it.” QUR’AN 8:61. See WAEL B. 
HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNI USUL AL-
FIQH 237-238. 
 11. SAEED supra note 7, at 57. 
 12. HALLAQ, supra note 10, at 238. 
 13. See id. 
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put, these scholars would say that a literal reading of the Qur’an, like any 
religious text, is not enough.14  
Other modern scholars deny the traditional harsh punishment and killing 
for apostasy by arguing that the hadith merely represent traditional values 
and political beliefs15 and are not automatically presumed to be binding 
Islam law.16 The theme of this modern approach is to return to the core 
principle of the law: “the purpose of the law is to promote the good life on 
earth, a life in which order, justice, and welfare are the prevailing norms.”17 
Therefore, any reaction to apostasy should be premised on this basis. These 
arguments juxtapose the traditional and fundamentalist positions with the 
moderate positions we see throughout the world today.18 
C. Honor Crimes Are Tied to Fundamentalist Islam 
There is also a parallel debate on whether Islam supports honor crimes 
and killings. An honor crime occurs when one family member hurts or kills 
another, typically a female, to cleanse the family of dishonor created by the 
victim’s behavior. It is particularly prevalent when a female family member 
has been sexually impure, or has been rumored to be, even if she has been 
raped.19 Scholars who argue that Islam promotes honor crimes point to the 
Qur’an’s punishment of one-hundred lashes for adultery,20 and the hadith, 
some of which recognize death by stoning as the proper sentence for 
adultery.21 Beyond harsh punishment for the crime of adultery, there may 
                                                                                                                           
 14. To further illustrate this point, Egyptian jurist Muhammed Ashmawi, who has 
served as professor, lawyer, and judge, discusses the two approaches as applied to the 
Qur’anic law prohibiting interest. While many Muslims have adopted the interest rule 
conclusively, he argues that the rule was given in the context of preventing economic 
exploitation and should be applied only for that reason today. Id. at 231, 238. 
 15. Magdi Abdelhadi, What Islam Says on Religious Freedom, BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 
2006, 7:40 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4850080.stm.  
 16. SAEED, supra note 7, at 59-61.  
 17. HALLAQ, supra note 10, at 224. 
 18. Abdelhadi, supra note 15.  
 19. Vivienne Walt, Brian Bennett & Scott Macleod, Marked Women, TIME, July 26, 
2004, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,994711,00.html (last 
visited July 2, 2011). 
 20. QUR’AN 24:2. 
 21. For example, 8 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI 82:819, seems to align with the Qur’an in its 
sentence of one hundred stripes. (M. Muhsin Khan trans.), available at 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/bukhari/
082.sbt.html (last visited July 2, 2011). But see 2 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, 23:413, vol. 8, 82:805 
and 82:814 (M. Muhsin Khan trans.) (authorizing stoning). See also SAHIH MUSLIM, 17:4191 
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be additional support in the Qur’an for honor killings. For example, in one 
passage a boy is killed because he “was going to oppress [his parents with 
his] rebellion and disbelief,” and instead the parents should be given a child 
who “is better in purity and nearer to mercy.”22  
Yet there is no direct support in the Qur’an for this type of crime or 
killing. Some scholars believe that honor killings are not tied to Islam at all, 
but are instead tied to male-dominated societies.23 The United Kingdom’s 
Parliament goes so far as to emphasize that the crimes are not based on any 
particular religion.24 Other scholars point to the prevalence of honor killings 
in poor, minority, and traditionalist communities, and argue that these 
communities cling to their identity as a safeguard against modern Western 
culture.25 A 2007 Turkish report on human rights found that honor crimes 
were most prevalent in the Kurdish communities of the country, which are 
predominantly Sunni Muslim, and more specifically in those that were 
underdeveloped, poor, and uneducated.26 Indeed, the Council of Europe has 
acknowledged that the drastic increase in honor crimes is concentrated in 
Muslim communities; but the Council finds that they occur in fundamental 
Christian, Hindu, and Sikh communities as well and, therefore, link the 
                                                                                                                           
(Abdul Hamid Siddiqui trans.) (containing the Hudud, or the Islamic penal law, that 
authorizes either lashes or stoning depending on whether the woman was married). 
 22. QUR’AN 18:74, 80-81 (emphasis added).  
 23. Q&A: Honour Killings Explained, BBCNEWS (June 22, 2004, 10:48 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3829139.stm.  
 24. HOUSE OF COMMONS HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FORCED 
MARRIAGE AND “HONOUR”-BASED VIOLENCE, 2007-8, H.C. 263-I, at 13 (U.K.) [hereinafter 
HOUSE OF COMMONS], available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/ 
pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/263/263i.pdf (last visited July 2, 2011). Parliament’s 
interpretation of “honor crime” is rather broad, including forced marriage, which also occurs 
in non-Muslim religions or cultures. Id. The United Kingdom contains 1.647 million 
Muslims as of 2001, a tremendous political presence. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MAPPING THE 
GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION: A REPORT ON THE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD’S 
MUSLIM POPULATION 32 (2009), available at http://pewforum.org/newassets/ 
images/reports/Muslimpopulation/Muslimpopulation.pdf (last visited July 2, 2011). 
 25. EUR. CONSULT. ASS., The Urgent Need To Combat So Called “Honour Crimes,” 3rd 
Sess., Doc. No. 11943 (2009) available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/ 
Doc09/EDOC11943.pdf (last visited July 2, 2011).  
 26. Communication to the Commission on the Status of Women on the Status of Kurdish 
Women in Turkey, KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT 10-13 (Aug. 12, 2009), 
http://www.khrp.org/khrp-news/human-rights-documents/2009publications/doc_details/227. 
The Kurdish people are mostly Sunni Muslim and live throughout southwest Asia in Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Armenia. Who Are the Kurds?, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm (last visited July 
2, 2011). 
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crime to non-religious causal factors found in “patriarchal” and 
“fundamentalist” communities that embrace traditional belief systems.27  
D. The Dichotomy Between Moderate and Fundamental Islam 
Fundamentalist Islamic communities embody all of these traditional 
characteristics and have been a known hotbed for honor and apostasy 
crimes.28 Muslim fundamentalism is a combination of tradition and religion 
that particularly invites violence against women, including honor crimes, as 
well as other acts of terrorism with which the modern world has become all 
too familiar.29 Fundamentalism has deep historical roots; some scholars 
trace it to an eighteenth-century revival movement, called the “Wahhabi” 
movement, which through time integrated radical religious and political 
beliefs with intolerance and violence.30 One professor describes the 
relationship between Islam and its fundamentalist variation: “[A] 
fundamentalist is a motor that warms up and then turns around too fast. Do 
not forget that fundamentalists do not do anything that is against Islam. . . . 
A fundamentalist will not take into account other ways of thinking in public 
life. He is not tolerant.”31  
The dichotomy between moderate and fundamentalist Islam is evident in 
the statements, lives, and viewpoints of the leaders of each group. From the 
moderate camp, the Muslim scholar Muqtedar Khan from Adrian College 
in Michigan illustrates the difference: “a moderate Muslim is therefore one 
who cherishes freedom of thought while recognizing the existential 
necessity of faith. She aspires for change, but through the power of mind 
and not through planting mines.”32 Abdurrahman Wahid personified this 
image as the first democratically elected president of Indonesia, the country 
with the largest Muslim population in the world. He wrote in 2005 that 
Muslim leaders need “the understanding and support of like-minded 
                                                                                                                           
 27. Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 25, at para. 21. 
 28. Sami Zemni, Islam, European Identity and the Limits of Multiculturalism, in 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE NEUTRALITY OF THE STATE: THE POSITION OF ISLAM IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 168 (W.A.R. Shadid & P.S. Van Koningsveld eds., 2002). 
 29. SHERENE H. RAZACK, CASTING OUT: THE EVICTION OF MUSLIMS FROM WESTERN 
LAW & POLITICS 104 (2008).  
 30. Bruce Gourley, Islamic Fundamentalism: A Brief Survey, pt. 2 (2003), 
http://www.brucegourley.com/fundamentalism/islamicfundamentalismintro.htm (last visited 
July 2, 2011). 
 31. Zemni, supra note 28, at 168. 
 32. Muqtedar Khan, Who are the “moderate Muslims”?, ISLAM FOR TODAY, 
http://www.islamfortoday.com/khan08.htm (last visited July 2, 2011).  
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individuals, organizations and governments throughout the world . . . to 
offer a compelling alternate vision of Islam, one that banishes the fanatical 
ideology of hatred to the darkness from which it emerged.”33  
A well-known moderate Muslim scholar explains the distinction in terms 
of legal interpretation. Wael Hallaq, a professor at Columbia University, 
suggests that the complexity of the Islamic law is due to a long history of 
legal speculating and drawing upon sources external to those most pure to 
Islam.34 The result is a highly technical law that has lost its focus and has 
sacrificed moderation and tolerance.35 He urges, instead, that modern law 
should focus on the ultimate aim of Islam, which is peace and public 
welfare under the mercy of Allah.36 “These are immutable . . . [b]ut the 
specific and individual rules that bring about the realization of these norms 
in society are mutable” and should take into account modern trends and real 
problems that occur with the “changing circumstances, locales, and 
times.”37 
Conversely, scholars in the fundamentalist camp have consistently 
condemned modern trends and have even violated human rights. For 
example, Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran denounced a bill to give women the 
right to vote and later became responsible for the deaths of thousands 
during his rise to power.38 In fact, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been a 
consistent supporter of terrorism and has been heavily responsible for 
terrorist activities in the Middle East.39  
Fundamentalism also rejects freedom of thought that moderate Muslims 
embrace. In Iran, a moderate Muslim professor named Shari’ati argued that 
original Islam promotes democratic principles and that the people should 
                                                                                                                           
 33. He is quoted in Paul Wolfowitz, Wahid and the Voice of Moderate Islam, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 6, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704842604574642353284 
811682.html. 
 34. HALLAQ, supra note 10, at 215. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 224. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Milton Viorst, Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, TIME, Apr. 13, 1998, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,988165-1,00.html.  
 39. See Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998). The 
Islamic Republic of Iran had provided two million dollars to the Shaqaqi faction of Palestine 
Islamic Jihad, which blew up a bus in Israel. Id. at 10-11. The Court also found that Iran had 
been designated a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration of 1979 continuously since 1984. Id. at 12. 
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reject the fascism and monarchy that permeated their government.40 
Khomeini later shut down the University where Shari’ati taught and 
imprisoned him.41 Another leader, the infamous terrorist Al-Zawahiri of Al-
Qaeda, published a book condemning Pakistan for its constitutional 
government because, he found, it contradicted Islamic law in that it 
respected popular sovereignty, did not wage jihad, or holy war, against all 
unbelievers, and because it was “subservient to America.”42 
E. The High Presence of Honor Crimes in Muslim Communities 
The extremist nature of Muslim fundamentalism is borne out by the fact 
that honor killings and terrorism have occurred primarily in countries with a 
strong fundamentalist Muslim presence, such as Afghanistan, Iran, 
Palestinian areas, Pakistan, Turkey, and others.43 The State Department lists 
four countries as being known sponsors of terrorism, three of them in the 
Middle East: Iran, Sudan, and Syria.44 All three have strong ties to 
Fundamentalist Islam: Iran is governed by a theocratic democracy and has a 
98% Muslim population; Sudan has had Islamic-oriented government since 
1956, bases its legal system primarily on Islamic law, and has a 70% 
Muslim population; and Syria bases its legal system in part on Islamic law 
and has a 74% Muslim population.45 
The bulk of the known cases for honor and apostasy crimes also occurs 
most commonly in Muslim countries. For example, at the height of 
insurgency and instability in Iraq, honor killings surged to an 
“unprecedented rate,” estimated in the hundreds.46 In 2007, Turkey 
                                                                                                                           
 40. BAQER MOIN, KHOMEINI: LIFE OF THE AYATOLLAH 173 (Thomas Dunnes Books 
2000) (1999).  
 41. Id. at 174.  
 42. New Book by Ayman Al-Zawahiri: ‘The Morning and the Lamp: A Treatise 
Regarding the Claim that the Pakistani Constitution is Islamic’, THE MIDDLE EAST MEDIA 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.memritv.org/report/en/3852.htm. 
 43. Zemni, supra note 28, at 164; Paul Marshall, Apostates from Islam: The Case of the 
Afghan Convert is Not Unique, THE WKLY STANDARD, Apr. 10, 2006, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/059fpgrn.asp.  
 44. See State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited July 2, 2011) (listing Cuba as the fourth 
country) .  
 45. The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (last visited July 2, 
2011). 
 46. Walt et al., supra note 19. 
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estimated a countrywide total of 231 honor crimes in that year alone.47 
Furthermore, there is evidence that fundamentalist communities do not act 
alone, but are supported by intolerant Middle Eastern governments that 
either promote honor and apostasy crimes, or at most rarely enforce a real 
punishment for them.48 For example, many of these governments enact laws 
that provide a substantially lesser sentence for crimes like murder that have 
been committed out of “honorable” motives.49  
Some governments even carry out the punishments for honor or apostasy 
crimes. Testimonies of the extremism of fundamentalist regimes in the 
Middle East pour out of men and women who have escaped severe 
punishments for dishonor or apostasy. For example, one Middle Eastern 
man named Bassam was arrested, tortured, and confined in solitude for one 
year by security forces after his conversion to Christianity.50 A Pakistani 
woman named Shahla was sentenced to life in prison because she was 
raped.51 While the moderate majority of Muslims do not engage in the 
atrocities produced by their fundamentalist counterparts, the trend reveals 
that there is a high correlation between a strong Muslim presence, a 
government that embraces Islamic law, and these types of crimes. 
F. Honor and Apostasy Killings Increase With the Growth of the Muslim 
Population 
With the increase in globalization and the strengthening of the European 
Union since the 1960s, Muslims have migrated in great numbers into the 
countries of the European Union.52 In Sweden, membership in recognized 
mosques grew by 26% from 1995 to 1999.53 In Denmark, the Muslim 
                                                                                                                           
 47. EUR. CONSULT. ASS., supra note 25, at para 22. 
 48. Marshall, supra note 43.  
 49. Syria’s penal code, Article 548, either completely exempts or substantially lessens 
the penalty for an honorable murder, such as one done to rectify a sexual immorality. See 
Diana Y. Vitoshka, The Modern Face of Honor Killing: Factors, Legal Issues, and Policy 
Recommendations, 22(2) BERKELEY UNDERGRADUATE J., 24 (2010), http://escholarship.org/ 
uc/item/401407hg (last visited July 2, 2011). 
 50. SUSAN CRIMP & JOEL RICHARDSON, WHY WE LEFT ISLAM: FORMER MUSLIMS SPEAK 
OUT 120-21 (2008).  
 51. Shahla Haeri, The Power of Dishonor: Rape and Power in Pakistan, in FAITH & 
FREEDOM: WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 161 (Mahnaz Afkhami ed., 
1995). 
 52. Zemni, supra note 28, at 158-59, 164. 
 53. Ake Sander & Goran Larssen, The Mobilisation of Islam in Sweden 1990-2000: 
From Green to Blue and Yellow Islam?, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE NEUTRALITY OF 
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presence was essentially nonexistent in the 1960s; today it is the second 
largest religious group.54 In Germany, the Muslim population rose to 3.2 
million as of 2002.55  
Migration is not the only cause for the growth of Muslim communities in 
the West; the high conversion rate to Islam and high birth rates among 
Muslims also contribute. Experts estimate a 1.84% yearly growth rate of 
Islam as a religion, compared to the growth rate of Christianity at 1.32%.56 
Furthermore, a recent demographical study confirmed the higher birth rates 
among Muslims as compared to their Christian and Jewish counterparts, 
although that gap is shrinking.57 In Austria, for example, the Muslim 
birthrate has decreased from 3.1% to 2.3% over the past twenty-five years, 
but both numbers still exceed the world population growth rate of only 
1.12% and the Roman Catholic birthrate of 1.3%.58 The above are just a 
few examples of the overall trend that is taking place across the European 
continent.  
European countries are forced to analyze their political and legal 
framework, not merely to accommodate the growing presence of Muslims, 
but to effectively deal with the challenges and crimes presented by the 
Islamic religious movement when accompanied by fundamentalism.59 
Germany illustrated this point when it began to reexamine its social 
structure after a young Afghan immigrant killed his sixteen-year-old sister, 
                                                                                                                           
THE STATE: THE POSITION OF ISLAM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 103 (W.A.R. Shadid & P.S. 
Van Koningsveld eds., 2002). 
 54. Jorgen Baek Simonsen, Constitutional Rights and Religious Freedom in Practice: 
The Case of Islam in Denmark, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE NEUTRALITY OF THE STATE: 
THE POSITION OF ISLAM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 20 (W.A.R. Shadid & P.S. Van 
Koningsveld eds., 2002).  
 55. Gerdien Jonker, Muslim Emancipation? Germany’s Struggle over Religious 
Pluralism, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE NEUTRALITY OF THE STATE: THE POSITION OF 
ISLAM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 42 (W.A.R. Shadid & P.S. Van Koningsveld eds., 2002). 
 56. The List: The World’s Fastest Growing Religions, FOREIGN POL’Y, May 14, 2007, 
http://www.ForeignPolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3835 (noting growth rates based on 
a period from 2000 to 2005 by the nondenominational World Christian Database). 
 57. Mary Mederios Kent, Do Muslims Have More Children Than Other Women in 
Western Europe?, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, Feb. 2008, http://www.prb.org/Articles/ 
2008/muslimsineurope.aspx.  
 58. Id.; The List, supra note 57. 
 59. Silvio Ferrari, Islam and the Western European Model of Church and State 
Relations, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE NEUTRALITY OF THE STATE: THE POSITION OF 
ISLAM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 16 (W.A.R. Shadid & P.S. Van Koningsveld eds., 2002).  
516 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:505 
 
 
admittedly because she had become too westernized.60 It is specifically 
these types of crimes that have acted as a catalyst to legal and non-legal 
efforts throughout Europe. However, the Council of Europe found that, 
despite various legal efforts to combat honor-based crimes, such crimes 
have drastically increased in recent years.61 It estimates that 5,000 honor 
killings occur each year, primarily in Muslim communities.62  
With more than 1.5 billion Muslims in the world in 2009, and with 
nearly 2.5 million living in the United States, it seems inevitable that honor 
and apostasy killings will increase within the U.S. as they have in Europe.63 
While the vast majority of Muslims in the U.S. are law-abiding and 
educated citizens,64 more extreme forms of Islam including the Wahhabi 
sect also enjoy the religious freedom this country provides.65  
G. The Increase of Honor Crimes in the U.S.  
Undeniably, honor crimes are no longer a merely hypothetical threat in 
the U.S.; instead, they have become a reality as stories continue to plague 
our headlines. There are four specific cases that have occurred in the U.S. 
that shed light on the motivation and evolution of an honor crime. The first 
of these occurred in 1989, when a Palestinian man suspected of links with a 
terrorist group called the Palestine Liberation Organization, stabbed his 
daughter in the chest with the help of his wife because she had defied his 
rules and become too westernized.66 Zein Isa and his wife Maria had set 
stringent rules for all of their daughters, such as banning them from dating 
outside the faith, playing sports, or leaving the home without permission.67 
Yet, Tina had a black boyfriend, worked at Wendy’s, played soccer, and 
went to a school dance.68 Her rebellion caused continual family tension and 
                                                                                                                           
 60. Afghan Girl’s ‘Honor Killing’ Sparks Debate in Germany, FOX NEWS, May 27, 
2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,358661,00.html. 
 61. EUR. CONSULT. ASS., supra note 25, at para. 14.  
 62. Id. at para. 19 (citation omitted).  
 63. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 24, at 32. 
 64. LAURA K. EGENDORF, ISLAM IN AMERICA 11 (2006).  
 65. Wahhabism is one strand of fundamentalist Islam that has been known to support 
terrorism. Id. at 15, 18-19. 
 66. Terror and Death at Home Are Caught in F.B.I. Tape, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1991, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/28/us/terror-and-death-at-home-are-caught-in-fbi-
tape.html; see also Murder in the Family: Honor Killings in America, FOXNEWS.COM (July 
26, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,391531,00.html. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Murder in the Family, supra note 66. 
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disputes, which led to her parents’ ultimate decision to kill her by stabbing 
her to death.69 
The second example occurred almost twenty years later, when a 
Pakistani man residing in the United States strangled his daughter, 
Sandeela, to protect the family’s honor from the stain of divorce.70 When 
she was nineteen, Sandeela was forced by her family to marry her cousin in 
Pakistan; soon after, she came back to the United States and they lived the 
rest of their married life apart.71 Eventually, she decided to end the marriage 
and, after filing the divorce papers, her relationship with her father 
deteriorated. The communication between them was severed for months 
before he killed her in their family’s home.72 
The third example occurred within months of Sandeela’s death, when a 
father shot his two teenage daughters because, as family and friends 
conjecture, the father was angry that they were dating against his will.73 He 
had previous outbursts of anger regarding their choice to date outside of the 
religion; in fact, he had earlier moved the family to another city over the 
same issue.74 In this case, the mother knew that at least a week beforehand 
he had threatened them.75 Because the father is still a fugitive, his motive 
has not been proven; however, experts identify the shooting as a 
quintessential honor crime, arising out of the father’s desire to purge the 
family from the shame of Muslim girls dating non-Muslim boys.76 
The last example took place in December of 2009, when an Iraqi man in 
Arizona ran over his daughter with his SUV, also because she had turned 
from her father’s strict values.77 Like Sandeela’s story, Noor Faleh 
Almaleki was subject to an arranged marriage to a man in Iraq. Instead of 
divorce, Noor returned to Arizona to live with her boyfriend and his 
                                                                                                                           
 69. Id.  
 70. David Schoetz, Daughter Rejects Marriage, Ends Up Dead, ABC NEWS, July 7, 
2008, http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=5322587.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Slain Teenage Girls’ Brother Begs for Suspect Father to Turn Himself In, FOX 
NEWS, Jan. 5, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,320487,00.html. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Dustin Gardiner, Man Charged With Murder in ‘Honor Killing’, THE ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2009, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2009/ 
12/22/20091222honorkill1222.html. 
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mother.78 Noor and her father had fought for years over her indiscretion, 
which led her father to the point of murder.79 
While these four cases vary in detail, they have many similarities. The 
motivating factors behind the four murders may be different in context, but 
they all stem from a perceived impropriety of the female victim and a desire 
to restore any honor lost from the impropriety. First, there is a very strict 
standard of conduct stemming from a combination of the Islamic faith and 
fundamentalist, anti-Western values. In these cases, that standard is seen in 
sets of behavioral and religious rules, such as a ban on dating or certain 
activities, and also in control over major life choices, such as forced 
marriage. The family friction builds as the daughter continues to defy these 
traditional rules. It is, however, difficult to pinpoint when the ultimate 
decision to harm or kill is made. In some cases it is a result of a clear and 
major defiance of an important Islamic principle, like divorce or 
fornication. However, in other cases, it is a result of many years of smaller 
rebellions. In Rifqa’s case, it was her conversion to Christianity and 
rejection of Islam that prompted the alleged threat. 
Regardless of the exact rules that have been broken, each case points 
toward the conclusion that the perceived moral wrong is deemed punishable 
outside of the judicial system, whether or not the person would have been 
found guilty under the laws of the country.80 Rather than taking the matters 
to courts of law, the family takes it upon itself to determine the guilt or 
innocence of the victim, and determines the victim’s fate based upon its 
own presuppositions.81 This pattern of extra-judicial criminal behavior must 
be isolated and punished to ensure freedom through the law. 
H. The Difficulty Western Law Faces in Dealing with Honor Crimes 
The international community has responded to the increase in honor 
crimes by recognizing the need for intervention before the crime is 
committed. Yet, the protection of law for those endangered for either 
apostasy or dishonoring the family is patchy at best.82 Typically, any 
                                                                                                                           
 78. Id.  
 79. Pete Kotz, Daughter Dies: Faleh Hassan Almaleki Now Faces Murder in Honor 
Killing, TRUE CRIME REPORT (Nov. 6, 2009, 4:27 PM), http://www.truecrimereport.com/ 
2009/11/daughter_dies_faleh_hassan_alm.php.  
 80. Diana Y. Vitoshka, supra note 49, at 4-5. 
 81. Id. at 5. 
 82. International law specifically tailored toward preventing honor killings is primarily 
in the form of punishment as deterrence. See David J. Western, Islamic “Purse Strings”: 
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preventative measure or protective facility is initiated by a non-
governmental organization. In a recommendation, the European Parliament 
acknowledges that “[t]here is a desperate shortage of refuge space and 
emergency housing for those fleeing domestic or so-called ‘honour’-based 
violence or forced marriage. A concerted effort across Government is 
required to improve access to short-term emergency accommodation and 
longer-term housing for victims.”83 
One effort has come through the British government’s Forced Marriage 
Unit (FMU) that rescues young women in the country who are forced to 
marry.84 While forced marriage is something the country wishes to 
eradicate, it is also the secondary crimes that result from forced marriage, 
such as rape, kidnapping, or murder, that, as seen in the above stories, 
provide the real threat. According to one Londoner of Indian decent, this 
relief finally came after the government had avoided the problem for years 
due to cultural sensitivity.85 
The FMU campaigns to raise awareness of forced marriage, works with 
embassies, and provides support to victims. In 2010, they helped 1,735 
people.86 While this supportive effort has had success, the United Kingdom 
has not declared forced marriage a criminal offense but instead bases any 
prosecution on either generic crimes, including assault and battery, kidnap, 
threats to kill and harassment, or more specialized legislation for domestic 
violence: the Domestic Violence, Crimes and Victims Act 2004.87 
However, in 2007, the United Kingdom created civil protection through the 
Forced Marriage Act, which protects those who are forced into marriage 
                                                                                                                           
The Key to the Amelioration of Women’s Legal Rights in the Middle East, 61 A.F. L. REV. 
79, 102-04 (2008).  
 83. HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 24, at 7.  
 84. Cesar G. Soriano, Groups Try to Break Bonds of Forced Marriage, U.S.A. TODAY, 
April 19, 2006; see also FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, MULTI-AGENCY PRACTICE 
GUIDELINES: HANDLING CASES OF FORCED MARRIAGE, 2009, at 17, available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/3849543/forced-marriage-guidelines09.pdf (last 
visited July 2, 2011) (noting that relief from forced marriage finally came after the 
government had avoided the problem for years due to cultural sensitivity). 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Victims of Forced Marriage, TRAVEL AND LIVING ABROAD, FOREIGN & 
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/when-things-
go-wrong/forced-marriage/ (last visited July 2, 2011). 
 87. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 84; HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra 
note 24, ¶¶ 37, 38. 
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either in the past, present, or future through protective orders.88 This Act 
also grants the power to arrest if there is a threat of violence.89 
III.  THE AMERICAN POLITICAL AND LEGAL STATE 
A. The Conflict between the United States Constitution and Sharia Law 
The American legal system, like that of Europe, is often unprepared to 
effectively deal with honor or apostasy crimes, yet little effort has been 
made to adapt to the challenge of religious “justice” at the hands of the 
victim’s relatives.90 America, like Europe, will be forced to respond to the 
challenge with changes to law and policy to prevent potential killings 
before they occur. In the face of a new era where these crimes become more 
common, the state has the obligation to protect children who are 
legitimately threatened with violence prompted by parental adherence to 
fundamentalist Islam. 
However, America is unlikely to find support from the Obama 
Administration for any shift in law or policy that would recognize the evils 
stemming from fundamentalist Islam, since the Administration for political 
reasons refuses to acknowledge the existence of fundamentalist or radical 
Islam and its tendencies as being a threat.91 In fact, the Administration has 
turned away from terms like “radical Islam,” “Islamic terrorism,” and any 
other phrase that links terror with Islam as being politically incorrect.92 The 
reasoning for this shift in policy is that the Obama Administration does not 
want to fuel the idea that the United States is at war with the religion of 
Islam.93 Yet, even Muslim-Americans in the community fear that he is 
missing the root cause: “[t]he ideology.”94 
                                                                                                                           
 88. Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, 2007, c. 20, (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/20/introduction/enacted/ (last visited July 2, 
2011). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Murder in the Family: Honor Killings in America, FOXNEWS.COM (July 26, 2008), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,391531,00.html.  
 91. See Michael Hirsh, A Politically Correct War, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 2010, available 
at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/17/a-politically-correct-war.html; Ryan Mauro, See 
No Radical Islam, Hear No Radical Islam, FRONTPAGEMAG.COM, May 17, 2010, 
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 92. Mauro, supra note 91. 
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 94. Hirsh, supra note 91. 
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Indeed, the problem stems from an irreconcilable conflict between the 
ideological foundations of Anglo-American law and the fundamental 
schools of Islamic law.95 This conflict is made apparent in Rifqa Bary’s 
case. Under two of the four traditional schools of Islamic law, the parent 
may actually have an obligation to kill an apostate child; the fundamentalist 
Islamic state, operating under that law, would support such a decree 
because upholding the principals of Islam takes precedence over individual 
liberty.96 Conversely, in the United States, protecting human life and 
individual liberty is the bedrock of our Constitution; and while parental 
rights are among a citizen’s most important rights under that Constitution, 
once parents compromise a child’s safety, they risk losing those rights. This 
doctrine, called “termination of parental rights,” will be explored in the next 
section as one possible preventative measure available to the states. 
B. Termination of Parental Rights as a Method of Prevention:  
Two Doctrines 
In the United States, a state can intervene and terminate parental rights 
only in very limited situations. This is because parents have one of “the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme] 
Court:” an interest in caring for and rearing a child.97 Two doctrines are 
available to give the state the authority to intervene: in loco parentis and 
parens patriae.  
In loco parentis occurs when a non-parent citizen stands in the role of 
the parent over the child, in spite of any objection by the biological or 
adoptive parent.98 Parens patriae occurs when the state steps in as a “wise, 
affectionate, and careful parent” over the child to determine the child’s 
welfare and best interest.99 The doctrines of in loco parentis and parens 
patriae require that any infringement on the parent’s rights must be 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.100 Indeed, even the 
highest of state interests can be secondary when compared to parental 
                                                                                                                           
 95. As opposed to moderate schools of Islamic law that are centered on peace. See infra 
text accompanying notes 34-37. 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9. 
 97. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 98. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (9th ed. 2009). 
 99. Roussel v. State, 274 A.2d 909, 925-26 (Me. 1971). 
 100. Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 214 (N.J. 2003). 
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rights.101 But this scale will always be tipped in favor of the state when a 
parent’s actions constitute a substantial threat to the child.102 
If a Muslim’s parental rights can be infringed based upon his 
commitment to fundamentalist Islam, would a state be violating one of the 
most foundational rights in the Constitution: the free exercise of religion? 
The First Amendment requires a deep probing into how far the state can 
interfere with the family relationship; the parents’ free exercise of religion 
must be balanced against the state interest in protecting the child.103 A 
variety of early cases discussed in the next section illustrate when the state 
interests weigh in favor of interference and when they prohibit it.  
C. History of Constitutional Protection of Parental Rights 
In the United States, parental rights have been consistently ranked 
among the highest of all protected liberties, and have significant insulation 
from the interference of the State.104 Nevertheless, this right was qualified 
in Prince v. Massachusetts, when the Court found in favor of the state by 
                                                                                                                           
 101. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (“Providing public schools ranks 
at the very apex of the function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was . . . 
made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately 
operated system. . . . Thus, a State’s interest in universal education, however highly we rank 
it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and 
interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment, and the traditional interest of the parents with respect to the religious 
upbringing of their children . . . .”). 
 102. Shepp v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165, 1174 (Pa. 2006) (finding the parental right to teach 
a child a faith with illegal practices, i.e., polygamy, was greater than the state interest in 
monogamy so long as the teachings “would [not] jeopardize the physical or mental health or 
safety of the child”). 
 103. Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The court will balance the “freedom 
of conscience and religious practice . . . [and] the parent’s claim to authority . . . in the 
rearing of her children . . . [against] the interest of society to protect the welfare of children, 
and the state’s assertion of authority to that end . . . .” Id. at 165. 
 104. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000). The Court originally developed 
parental rights doctrines in three cases. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a 
Nebraska law that prohibited the teaching of German to children before the eighth grade 
because the Court acknowledged one’s right to “establish a home and bring up children” as 
being fundamental under the Fourteenth Amendment. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). That right 
was confirmed in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, when an Oregon statute prohibiting parents 
from sending their children to private schools was overturned because the parental interest in 
their child’s education weighed more heavily than that of the state. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 
(1925). 
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upholding the state’s authority under parens patriae105 to limit parental 
rights, even if those rights are protected under the First Amendment.106 The 
Court cited various instances where that power is legitimate,107 but noted 
that if the state’s interference also involves an issue of freedom of religion, 
it would only be upheld to protect a child from danger.108 That standard has 
since been defined: if “it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the 
health or safety of the child,” parental rights will be subject to limitation 
even if tied to a First Amendment right.109 
Before any state intervention is possible, however, those parental rights 
must be vigorously protected by fundamentally fair proceedings, meaning 
that a parent cannot be deprived of custody of his child without due process 
of law.110 The Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution requires notice to the parents, a chance for them 
to be heard, and some standard of evidence, such as clear and convincing, 
of the state’s basis for the termination of parental rights.111  
In a termination proceeding, the first inquiry the court must make is 
whether the parent is “at fault,” which is usually defined in terms of 
unfitness to raise his child.112 The state must always presume that the parent 
is fit and acting in the best interest of the child,113 and must prove unfitness 
                                                                                                                           
 105. Parens patriae is when the state acts as the parent to the child in its capacity “as a 
sovereign . . . and as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (9th ed. 2004). 
 106. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that the state interest in 
prohibiting distribution of literature by minors was greater than the guardian’s right to 
practice religion). 
 107. Such instances include required school attendance, prohibition of the child’s labor, 
and compulsory vaccinations. Id. at 166. 
 108. Id. at 167. 
 109. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) (finding that the state interest in 
universal education was secondary to the parental right to educate children at home).  
 110. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645, 645 (1972). 
 111. Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Validity and Application of Statute Allowing 
Endangered Child to be Temporarily Removed from Parental Custody, 38 A.L.R.4th 756 
(2009); see also In re Willis, 207 S.E.2d 129, 138, 140 (W. Va. 1973) (explaining that the 
Constitution guarantees parents notice and an opportunity to be heard; furthermore, “in order 
to separate a child from its parents on the ground of their unfitness, there must be clear, 
cogent and convincing proof.”). 
 112. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759-60 (1982).  
 113. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).  
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by at least clear and convincing evidence.114 Adhering to these 
constitutional minimums, states are free to enact statutes that regulate 
parental rights and determine the grounds for a finding of parental unfitness 
that leads to a termination of rights, e.g., abandonment, neglect, or abuse.115  
These Due Process procedures point to the underlying policy: that the 
court’s primary focus is the interest of the parents; the child’s interest is 
only relevant once some parental fault is determined.116 The Supreme Court 
emphasized this point in Santosky v. Kramer: “The factfinding [hearing] 
does not purport—and is not intended—to balance the child’s interest in a 
normal family home against the parents’ interest in raising the child. . . . 
Rather, the factfinding hearing pits the state directly against the parents.”117 
Indeed, only after the state proves unfitness may the court even ask what is 
in the best interest of the child, either to continue living with the parents or 
to be placed in foster care or adopted.118 In applying this concept to a case 
like Rifqa’s, before any state intervention is possible, the state must prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that the parents pose enough of a threat to 
the child to make them unfit. If a state fails to protect the parent’s 
procedural and substantive due process rights by acting rashly, or without 
sufficient evidence, the child could be exposed to even more instability and 
danger by being forced back into an unhealthy situation.119 
D. Various State Approaches To Protection Of Children Against  
Abusive Parents 
Many states have enacted statutes that allow them to temporarily remove 
a child when there is an imminent danger or threat to that child’s physical 
                                                                                                                           
 114. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48.  
 115. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111 (2003) (enumerating the grounds for termination of 
parental rights).  
 116. This policy is based on the assumption that the parents have the child’s best interest 
at heart. Catherine J. Ross, Legal Constraints on Child Saving: The Strange Case of the 
Fundamental Latter-Day Saints at Yearning for Zion Ranch, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 373 
(2008). 
 117. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982). 
 118. Ross, supra note 116, at 374 (citing S.L. v. C.A., 995 P.2d 17, 29-30 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999) (Wilkins, J., concurring) and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301(7) (West 2007) 
(considering the child’s best interests only after at least one statutory ground for terminating 
the parental rights was established)). 
 119. Id. at 377 (providing two cases where, due to the failure of the trial courts to fully 
protect the parental due process rights, the children were forced back into the parents’ house 
even though the circumstances were unfortunate for the children).  
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well being. Because these “emergency” statutes only authorize temporary 
removal, which eventually can lead to permanent termination of parental 
rights, they do not require the same level of due process.120 If removal is 
planned in advance, it will require a court order or some form of procedure 
and approval; but, if it meets that statute’s definition of emergency, the state 
need not seek approval before taking action, although it will be subject to 
review shortly thereafter.121  
Emergency removal statutes have been upheld as constitutional because, 
if an imminent danger exists and removal is immediately necessary, the 
state’s interest in the protection of the child becomes compelling.122 Yet the 
interest only remains compelling for a short period of time, and the parent’s 
due process interests require a timely judicial hearing to determine whether 
the child remains in such danger that parental rights should be 
terminated.123 
These statutes differ slightly in each state, but retain some consistencies 
in their language and character. For example, in West Virginia, the state can 
temporarily take a child from the custody of her parents if there is “an 
imminent danger to the physical well-being of the child” and no reasonable 
alternative to removing the child from the home.124 Florida’s emergency 
removal statute similarly provides for temporary removal of children who 
                                                                                                                           
 120. See, e.g., Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“Government officials are required to obtain prior judicial authorization before intruding on 
a parent's custody of her child unless they possess . . . ‘reasonable cause to believe that the 
child is in imminent danger’ . . . .”) (citation omitted); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 
581, 594 (2nd Cir. 1999) (“In ‘emergency circumstances,’ a child may be taken into custody 
by a responsible State official without court authorization or parental consent.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 121. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 594; see also Ross, supra note 116, at 380.  
 122. Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Validity and Application of Statue Allowing 
Endangered Child to Be Temporarily Removed From Parental Custody, 38 A.L.R.4th 757-
63 (1985); State ex rel. Miller v. Locke, 253 S.E.2d 540, 541 (W. Va. 1979) (upholding a 
statute that gave the state the power to remove a child from his home for up to ten days if 
there was (1) an imminent danger to the physical well-being of the child, and (2) no 
reasonably available alternatives to the child’s removal).  
 123. Judicial hearings have been upheld as timely in statutes that required them five days 
after removal, Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C. 1973), aff’d by 414 U.S. 1139 
(1974), and even up to forty-five days, State in re Alexander, 384 So. 2d 1003 (La. App. 4 
Cir. 1980). But procedural due process is violated if a judicial hearing is not given at all or 
not given “as soon as practicable.” Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976). 
 124. W. VA. CODE § 49-6-3 (2009).  
526 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:505 
 
 
are in “imminent danger of illness or injury,” but only if it is “a result of 
abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”125 
The state must meet its burden of proof that imminent danger126 exists 
according to the statute, regardless of whether it seeks a court order before 
removal or conducts an emergency removal without a court order.127 While 
the standard of proof for permanent termination of parental rights must be 
at least clear and convincing,128 the standard for the initial temporary 
removal need only be based on  a fair preponderance of the evidence.129 To 
meet the state’s standard of proof, the state may rely on both direct and 
circumstantial evidence.130 That evidence, under the Fourth Amendment’s 
search and seizure clause, must be more than a mere abstract government 
interest in protecting children generally; it requires case-specific evidence. 
Seizure by a child welfare official must be based on “some definite and 
articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has 
been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse.”131  
Cases resolving what constitutes imminent danger generally look first for 
evidence of past physical abuse of the child.132 Courts have relied on 
circumstantial evidence to determine the likelihood of physical abuse, often 
                                                                                                                           
 125. FLA. STAT. § 39.401 (2010). In addition, a parent’s rights can eventually be 
permanently terminated if the child is “at substantial risk of imminent abuse . . . by the 
parent or parents or legal custodians,” and the parent fails to comply with the case plan. FLA. 
STAT. § 39.806(1)(e) (2009); FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(f) (2009). 
 126. Imminent danger, harm, or threat are hereafter used interchangeably. 
 127. Some statutes, like New York’s, require that if a child welfare agent decides to 
remove a child without a court order, he or she must first have probable cause to believe that 
a threat of harm is imminent. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 417 (Consol. 2009); N.Y. FAMILY CT. 
ACT § 1024 (Consol. 2009). West Virginia requires probable cause before emergency 
removal. W. VA. CODE § 49-6-3(c) (2009).  
 128. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 129. In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313, 1325 (Conn. 1983). Some states, 
however, including West Virginia, maintain a higher standard. In re Willis, 207 S.E.2d 129, 
140 (W. Va. 1973) (stating that the burden of proof is clear, convincing, and cogent). 
 130. See In re Jonathan Michael D., 459 S.E.2d 131, 137 (W. Va. 1995); State v. Adams, 
557 P.2d 586, 589 (N.M. 1976).  
 131. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 515 (7th Cir. 2003).  
 132. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 139 F.3d 581 (2nd Cir. 1999). For example, one West 
Virginia court held that there was no imminent danger in a case initiated by a grandmother 
who alleged that her daughter was not providing medical or financial care for the child. State 
ex rel. Virginia M. v. Virgil S., 475 S.E.2d 548 (W. Va. 1996). 
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without any direct evidence.133 Some states have even found imminent 
danger to a child who has never been abused if the parent had abused a 
sibling.134 Yet, past abuse is not a necessary requirement, and many other 
factors that expose a risk of harm to the child do have weight.135 
Furthermore, some courts find that a parent’s course of conduct in totality 
poses an imminent threat to the child.136 
These cases are grounded on present or past action that points to the 
substantial likelihood of danger, even if that action is not itself abuse. 
Applying this principle in the context of the threat of an honor or apostasy 
crime, it appears in most cases the only past action that would support the 
likelihood of danger is twofold: first, the past acts of adherence to a belief 
system that encourages the crime; second, threats or threatening conduct 
indicating that the belief will be carried out. Recent honor killings in the 
United States provide helpful illustration. In many of the cases, the parent 
urges the child to adhere to particular fundamentalist Islamic principles and 
takes away the child’s freedom of choice by actions such as forced marriage 
or a prohibition against working, playing sports, etc. The child then rebels 
against those standards, creating family tension and fighting that ultimately 
lead to the parent’s intent to harm. If the intent to harm translates into 
spoken threats, those threats could provide evidence of imminent danger to 
the child.  
Even if temporary removal is successful, however, unless such threats 
meet the high burden for permanent removal, which is detailed below, the 
child will be returned to the home. Conversely, if the intent to harm arises is 
the parent’s mind without an overt threat, it will have to be proven using 
other circumstantial evidence which will likely prove insufficient, because 
                                                                                                                           
 133. In Connecticut, the unexplained death of one child combined with questionable 
marks on his body provided sufficient evidence of the possibility that his siblings were in 
imminent danger. In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313, 1325 (Conn. 1983). 
 134. See In re George B., 518 S.E.2d 863, 871 (W. Va. 1999). Contra In re M.F. v. Fla. 
Dep’t of Children & Families, 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2000). 
 135. J.O. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 970 So. 2d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 
Dist. 2007) (finding a parent’s use and sale of illegal drugs created imminent harm); Cooper 
v. Wiley, 128 A.2d 455 (N.Y. 1987) (finding a failure to give adequate medical treatment 
could constitute imminent harm if that treatment is necessary and the parents have not 
provided an acceptable course of treatment). 
 136. In Texas, a parent’s acts, omissions, and failures to act may create a “voluntary, 
deliberate, and conscious course of conduct” that endangers the child, but more than just one 
act or omission is required. In re J.J.S., 272 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App. 2008) (finding a 
mother’s involvement in numerous abusive relationships constituted a course of conduct that 
exposed her children to a threat of danger, and forfeited her parental rights).  
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the link between the belief system and a threat to the child in question must 
be proven. A recent Texas case illustrates this point when tension between 
Texas law and fundamentalist Mormonism resulted in an illegal temporary 
removal of children. 
E. Yearning for Zion Ranch: A Case Study  
In Yearning for Zion Ranch, the state stepped in to protect children from 
a pervasive belief system that condoned certain destructive and illegal 
practices.137 The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services 
removed over 450 children from Yearning for Zion Ranch. The ranch was a 
compound associated with the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints,138 which splintered from the national LDS church when 
the latter officially renounced polygamy. The Fundamentalists’ belief 
system recognizes polygamy and underage marriage. As one online poster 
explained,  
if God had meant a [thirteen] year old girl not to be pregnant he 
would not have given her the gift of the ability to conceive a 
child. If God had meant only young men to father children . . . he 
would have . . . stopped their production of sperm when they 
became [twenty-five] years of age.139  
The Department acted under the Texas emergency statute to remove the 
children after receiving a distress call from one sixteen-year-old female and 
discovering five pregnant teenagers through an investigation. The 
Department determined that all 466 children were at risk of underage 
marriage and/or pregnancy due to the oppressive nature of a belief system 
that would condone such action.  
Under the Texas statute, immediate danger to the physical health or 
safety of the child warrants removal of the child by the Department.140 The 
statute authorizes the action without a court order only “[i]f there is no time 
to obtain a temporary restraining order or attachment” from the court before 
removal,141 and only “when the circumstances indicate a danger to the 
physical health . . . of the children and the need for protection is so urgent 
                                                                                                                           
 137. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3652 (Tex. App. May 22, 
2008), aff’d, In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008).  
 138. 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3652 at *1. 
 139. Ross, supra note 116, at 392 (citations omitted).  
 140. TEX. FAM. CODE Ann. § 262.104(a) (West 2008).  
 141. Id. 
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that immediate removal . . . is necessary.”142 The Court of Appeals found 
that the state failed to meets its burden of proving immediate danger to the 
children.143 The only evidence proffered was the five pregnant teenagers 
and the existence of a belief system that condoned the alleged sexual 
activity, which was insufficient to prove immediate danger under the 
statute.  
First, the pregnancy of the five teenagers was not evidence of imminent 
danger of sexual abuse to the other 461 children, especially the boys in the 
group. Second, and more on point, it is not the mere existence of the belief 
system, the court said, that places the children in physical danger. Rather, it 
is the “imposition of certain alleged tenets of that system on specific 
individuals that may put them in physical danger.”144 This analysis is 
consistent with the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure rules in regard to children, which require “individualized 
suspicion.”145 While failing to further define or elaborate this holding, the 
court points to a lack of evidence that the practice is likely to be carried out 
on the individual children. The court did indicate that appropriate evidence 
would have shown that someone in each child’s house was proven likely to 
subject the child to underage sex or marriage, or that a specific and 
established threat existed to pubescent females beyond a mere religious 
belief.146 The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the holding, but declined to 
address the constitutional issues and remanded the case based on other 
options available to the Department under Texas law.147 
A minor in Rifqa’s position may find solace in the Texas holding. Under 
this framework, there is some evidence that Rifqa, as an individual rather 
than as a member of a community, was in imminent danger of physical 
harm. Yet, her case might still fail the Texas test because the danger 
inherently stems from her parents’ fundamentalist Islamic religious 
belief.148 In her affidavit, given while fighting a compulsory return to her 
                                                                                                                           
 142. In re Steed, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3652 at *3. 
 143. Id. at *14. 
 144. Id. at *10 (emphasis added). 
 145. Ross, supra note 116, at 399.  
 146. In re Steed, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3652 at *10.  
 147. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008). 
 148. See Bary’s affidavit and the memorandum submitted by her attorney: Bary 
Affidavit, supra note 1; Investigation and Intelligence Memorandum in Support of Petition 
for Dependency, In re Fathima Rifqa Bary, No. DP09-580 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug., 2009), 
available at http://orlandolawyer.tv/documents/Noor%20Memo%20of%20Law.pdf (last 
visited July 2, 2011). 
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parents’ custody, paragraphs four through fourteen are statements regarding 
her parents’ faith, especially that of her father.149 They describe the 
devotion of her father, the fundamentalism of his mosque, and his strict 
imposition of the faith on the children. This “belief” evidence alone is 
insufficient for the state to interfere. As in Yearning for Zion Ranch, the 
existence of a pervasive belief system in and of itself would not be 
sufficient evidence because there is an indeterminate possibility of harm, 
and not necessarily evidence of imminent danger.  
Yet, unlike the facts in Yearning for Zion Ranch, Rifqa does allege some 
evidence of the specific and individualized imposition of the faith that 
would result in her harm or death. She states that her father “had a serious 
talk” with her, “confronted her,” and displayed a “fit of anger.”150 Parental 
anger and volatility seems to proliferate the past cases of honor killings, and 
points to the possibility of an honor crime. Mere arguments and family 
tension, however, are not enough evidence of an actual threat. But, Rifqa 
also claims that her father threatened to kill her, and her mother threatened 
to send her back to Sri Lanka.151 Would these types of alleged threats point 
to specific and imminent harm that would be enough for a state agent to 
find an emergency basis to interfere? Even if emergency removal is 
qualified, would it translate into permanent termination of rights?  
F. Texas Standards for Emergency Removal and Permanent Termination 
In Texas, if a child welfare agent removes a child without a court order, 
the child must be returned to the parents in the initial hearing, occurring 
within one to three business days after the removal,152 unless the court finds 
by the civil standard there is “a continuing danger to the physical health or 
safety of the child.”153 Then, the law requires a second hearing called a “full 
adversarial hearing” within fourteen days of the removal.154 In that hearing, 
a court must determine by the civil standard that: 
(1) there was a danger to the physical health or safety of the 
child which was caused by an act or failure to act of the person 
                                                                                                                           
 149. Bary Affidavit, supra note 1, ¶ 4-14.  
 150. Id. ¶ 17,18, and 20. 
 151. Id. ¶ 20-21.  
 152. The state has a five-day period before it legally takes possession of the child. TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.106(d) (West 2008). 
 153. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 262.106–107 (West 2008) (one of three elements the court 
must find at the initial hearing). 
 154. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201 (West 2008). 
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entitled to possession and for the child to remain in the home is 
contrary to the welfare of the child; 
 
(2) the urgent need for protection required the immediate 
removal of the child and reasonable efforts, consistent with the 
circumstances and providing for the safety of the child, were 
made to eliminate or prevent the child's removal; and 
 
(3) reasonable efforts have been made to enable the child to 
return home, but there is a substantial risk of a continuing 
danger if the child is returned home.155 
To determine whether “continuing danger” exists under the third prong, 
the court may consider whether the child’s household contains a person 
who:  
(1) has abused or neglected another child in a manner that caused 
serious injury to or the death of the other child; or  
 
(2) has sexually abused another child.156  
Under this framework, the state must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the particular parents have actually threatened the child’s life 
or health by an act or failure to act, so much so that the child should not be 
returned to the home because of the continuing danger. This imposes the 
burden to prove that a substantial risk of a continuing danger and an urgent 
need for protection have become outwardly evident before a temporary 
order of removal is given. If it cannot do so, the state will fail and the child 
could possibly become another victim.  
If the state succeeds in obtaining a temporary order under the above 
statutes, the state must then file for a permanent termination of rights within 
forty-five days.157 This requires the state to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence one of the grounds for termination, which includes “engag[ing] in 
conduct . . . which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the 
child.”158  
                                                                                                                           
 155. Id. (emphasis added). 
 156. TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.201(d) (West 2008). 
 157. TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.105 (West 2008). 
 158. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.206 (West 2008); TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(1)(E) (West 
2008).  
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For the initial hearing, the full adversary hearing, and the suit for 
involuntary termination of parental rights, proof may be difficult to 
ascertain because family members and close friends who may know of the 
threat may choose to conceal it if they adhere also to the ideology, want to 
protect the potential killer, or are terrified for their own life. To illustrate 
this point, the mother of the two girls who were killed in Texas knew about 
the father’s threat but chose not report it to authorities.159 In addition, the 
Palestinian man in St. Louis had not only the support of his other daughters, 
who knew about his plan to kill his daughter, but also the help of his wife in 
the slaying.160 This protectionism is exacerbated by the fact that Muslim 
fundamentalists typically only associate within their communities and 
require the same of their children, so the people who could potentially 
know about the situation are of the same belief system.161  
Moreover, during the termination suit, the state may have no evidence 
that the parents have “engaged in conduct . . . which endangers the physical 
or emotional well-being of the child,” if there has been no past abuse.162 
Yet, as we have seen, the lack of past abuse does not negate the true 
criminal intent of the parent.  
IV.  PROPOSAL: ADOPTING METHODS TO FACE THE CHALLENGES OF 
HONOR CRIMES 
It is clear that the United States faces the problem of honor killings 
within families, and that the law is not equipped to fully combat it. But the 
question remains: what should the states do about it? At what point can the 
Rifqa Bary’s of our communities, whose parent legitimately threatens her 
security and her life, find solace in the law? It is plainly a hard question to 
ask, because the problem is complex and involves belief systems, which are 
so vital and esteemed in this country. But hard questions shouldn’t be 
avoided. In fact, there may be a variety of possible solutions.  
The first category of solutions, which will not be thoroughly discussed, 
is non-legal. It would be remiss not to at least suggest the possibility for 
state legislatures to take steps by raising awareness within the law 
enforcement community. They can do so by simply accounting for these 
                                                                                                                           
 159. FOX NEWS, supra note 60. 
 160. Terror and Death at Home Are Caught in F.B.I. Tape, supra note 66. 
 161. For example, one of the strict rules of the Palestinian father was that his daughters 
were forbidden from dating outside the faith or even from leaving home without permission, 
preventing their communication and interaction with the outside world. Id. 
 162. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(1)(E) (West 2008) (emphasis added). 
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types of crimes in their state and training the police force in ways to 
recognize apostasy and honor crimes and the motives behind them. In 
addition, states could partner with NGOs to provide a number of resources 
for women and children who feel threatened by such a crime. Sharing of 
information and education can be achieved by offering a website or hotline 
for potential victims to network, talk to someone they can trust, learn about 
their legal rights, obtain legal support, and report the situation in a safe and 
confidential matter. Finally, the ultimate non-legal protection would come 
in the form of a safe house, providing temporary housing either for children 
who have been removed from their home or for those who have fled their 
home in fear.  
It is the ultimate authority of the state to ensure the welfare, morals, 
safety, and health of its citizens.163 The primary mechanism for achieving 
that is through the arm of the law. Therefore, legislatures should not shy 
away from enacting law to directly and effectively stop fundamentalist 
parents who want to harm or slay their child for their religious 
disobedience. This is not the type of religious practice that the First 
Amendment meant to protect, and it is within the state’s realm of authority 
to prevent it.164 Even more, it is the state’s duty to protect it.165  
A. Emergency Removal When Criminal Intent Is Present 
Among the different methods available to a state, one solution is to 
expand the authority of temporary state intervention when a child claims to 
be threatened by this type of crime. The ultimate question is: what can the 
courts constitutionally consider to be an immediate danger that poses an 
individualized threat to the child? Past honor crimes illustrate the tendency 
of fundamentalist parents to kill or harm their child after a series of minor 
rebellions against traditional, anti-western rules or practices (i.e., western 
social behavior such as dating, working, or playing sports), or after a major 
rebellion (i.e, rejecting a forced marriage), because of the impropriety of the 
behavior and the desire to rid the family name of dishonor.166  
While the law cannot target any particular belief system, it can target 
criminal intent. Furthermore, the law can take motive into account. Creating 
                                                                                                                           
 163. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1446 (9th ed. 2004) (defining “state police power”). 
 164. See supra text accompanying footnotes 106-09. 
 165. See FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 3 (3rd ed. 2007) (defining and confining the role 
of law “to protect persons, liberties, and properties; to maintain the right of each, and to 
cause justice to reign over us all”).  
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 66-76. 
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a motive-based provision within the emergency removal laws is un-
chartered territory; motive-based crimes, however, are not new to the 
justice system. For example, conspiracy law, unlawful purpose statutes, 
race-based and hate-crimes all mandate a harsher sentence due to the 
motive of the crime.167 While not in the penal code, this law would 
similarly target a motive-based intent before the crime has taken place.  
A model statute, based on Texas’ emergency removal provision with 
italics indicating what has been added, could read: 168 
(d) In determining whether there is a continuing danger to the 
physical health or safety of a child, the court may consider 
whether the household to which the child would be returned 
includes a person who: 
(1) has abused or neglected another child in a manner that 
caused serious injury to or the death of the other child; or  
(2) has sexually abused another child; or 
(3) threatened the child, by words or acts, with the intent to 
commit a specified offense against a child for the purpose 
of removing a perceived dishonor that the child’s behavior 
has brought upon the household. A removal under this 
section must not be conducted solely on the basis of 
activities protected by the first amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
(e) A “specified offense” is an offense defined by any of the 
following provisions of this chapter: . . .169 
In practice, this would mean that an officer is authorized to remove a 
child without a warrant when the elements are met: (1) a parent’s specific 
intent to commit a crime, (2) motivated by the desire to restore family 
honor by removing the culprit’s dishonor, and (3) specific action, in the 
form or words or acts, that indicates their willingness to act on such beliefs. 
As far as the first element is concerned, specific intent crimes are pervasive 
in our legal code and therefore this requirement should not pose a problem 
to law enforcement officials or judges. This element is essential because it 
limits the reach of law to remove a child only when the parent intends to 
                                                                                                                           
 167. Joshua S. Geller, A Dangerous Mix: Mandatory Sentence Enhancements and the 
Use of Motive, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 623, 623 (2005). See also 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2003). 
 168. TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.201(d) (West 2008). 
 169. The clause would then include any crime already within the penal code, and their 
section number. For a hate crime law that uses similar structure, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
485.05(3) (McKinney 2003).  
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commit a criminal offense as defined in the statute; the provision will not 
apply to common parental discipline.  
However, the second element will admittedly be more problematic, 
given the uncertainty of what would constitute a “perceived dishonor.” The 
purpose of this element is to require a showing to the magistrate judge by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the motive to commit an honor crime 
exists. Therefore, in order for a magistrate judge to sign the court order 
authorizing removal, the state would have to provide evidence of the 
perceived dishonor. That evidence would come in the form of testimony by 
the child, or by a person close with either the child or the child’s parents, 
and must state two conditions. First, the testimony must show what 
behavioral expectations were placed on the child as a result of extreme 
ideological beliefs, and second, what actions were taken by the child that 
failed to meet those expectations.  
To reiterate, these two conditions are based on the pattern of past honor 
crimes, where the parents create extreme limitations on the child, such as a 
forced marriage, the prohibition of the child to fraternize with those outside 
of the religion, and other rules significantly limiting the child’s freedom. In 
Rifqa’s case, it was her inability to choose her own religion freely that 
caused the parent’s intent to harm. It is not these “rules” that this Comment 
seeks to punish, because parents of all religions and cultures have the right 
to raise their child as they best see fit. Rather, it is the intent of the parent to 
harm their child in the event that the child breaks the rules that needs to be 
prevented. Therefore, when evaluating the evidence, the judge must use 
discretion in determining whether the ideological beliefs that lead a person 
to commit an honor crime, regardless of what religion the person is, truly 
exist. That is why the judge and the law enforcement officials must be 
students of honor crimes in order to understand the extreme nature of the 
beliefs that lead to the crimes and how they reveal themselves practically.  
Under the third element, the individualized threat must be manifested 
and evidenced by the words or acts of the parent. This also may be shown 
by testimony by the child or by a person who is close with the either child 
or the child’s parents. This element is essential because it requires that the 
parent’s words or actions amount to a threat of harm, thereby protecting 
parents who may have strong beliefs, but pose no actual risk to a child. 
Child testimony should be sufficient in proving all three elements under the 
proposed temporary removal statute, as others in the community tend to 
hide the criminal intent of the parents.  
Finally, the model statute contains the provision that no removal may be 
made “solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States.” While case law governing parental 
536 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:505 
 
 
rights already protect parental freedom under the first amendment, it is 
important for law enforcement officials and magistrate judges to understand 
that even in this particular query, they cannot undertake investigations 
leading to the removal of a child by simply identifying members of certain 
religions that might lead to an honor crime. The individualized suspicion 
must be grounded on the parent’s manifested intent to commit a crime.  
B. Permanent Termination When Criminal Intent Is Present 
Emergency removal will only be effective in these cases if it leads to 
permanent termination of parental rights. However, as seen in Texas’ 
involuntary termination statute, the parent will only lose his or her rights if 
they have already “engaged” in conduct that endangers the child. While a 
liberal court may find threatening statements to meet this element, judges 
who keep close to the text would likely not. Therefore, the involuntary 
termination statute should include a provision for cases when the child is in 
danger based on the parent’s intent to harm with an honor-based motive, 
similar to the model emergency statute. A model termination statute, again 
based on the Texas statute with italics indicating what has been added, 
would read: 
The court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the 
court finds by clear and convincing evidence: 
(1) that the parent has:  
. . . . 
(F) threatened the child, by words or acts, with the intent to 
commit a specified offense against a child for the purpose of 
removing a perceived dishonor that the child’s behavior has 
brought upon the household. A termination under this section 
must not be conducted solely on the basis of activities protected 
by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
(i) A “specified offense” is an offense defined by any of the 
following provisions of this chapter: . . .  
This language mimics the proposed language in the temporary removal 
statute because the evidence needed to prove a legitimate threat exists 
essentially revolves around the same three elements.170 However, as 
previously explained, a termination requires more proof of danger to the 
child because constitutionally there is a higher burden when dealing with 
permanent termination of parental rights; it must rise to the level of clear 
                                                                                                                           
 170. See supra text accompanying note 169. 
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and convincing.171 This makes sense, as a court would not want to infringe 
upon parental rights unless there is certain to be an actual danger to the 
child. While in a temporary removal, the child’s testimony alone should 
suffice to meet the preponderance standard, in a termination hearing the 
state would want corroborating evidence, such as testimony by a sibling, 
the other parent, a relative, or a close friend of the family. Again, it will be 
a difficult burden to meet because of the hidden nature of the threats and the 
closed-off nature of the community. Therefore, police and law enforcement 
officials should be trained in how to look for evidence in this type of 
environment. 
C.  Extending Time Allotted for Voluntary Leave of Children 
Some children, like Rifqa, run away from their homes because of the 
intense fear of losing their life, rather than simply notifying the police of 
potential harm. Indeed, this reaction seems somewhat likely, especially if a 
child is threatened by more than one person in the family, like Zein Isa.172 
Therefore, a legal option for states to consider in addition to the above 
amendments is to extend the legal time allowed for children who 
voluntarily leave their homes in fear of an honor or apostasy crime. Many 
states grant authority for state custody when the child has run away from 
home.173 In Texas, the state only has fourteen days to prove that there is a 
substantial risk of continuing danger to the child in order to obtain a 
temporary order.174 This allotment may not be enough time for the state to 
find sufficient evidence to prove their case, since as the trend illustrates, the 
threats will be concealed under the parents’ belief in extrajudicial action 
and the community support for it. Therefore, this safety measure would 
provide children with an extended escape if the threat were legitimate, 
while allowing the state an additional time to investigate whether or not the 
threat is real.175 But this time extension would only be valuable if the 
temporary removal and termination statutes already include language like 
the proposed above, in order to give judges the authority to protect children 
faced with apostasy or honor-based crimes.  
                                                                                                                           
 171. See supra text accompanying note 114. 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69. 
 173. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.15.125 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-
401 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-45 (2010); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6324 (West 
2010);. 
 174. TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.201 (West 2008). 
 175. In any state, federal law requires that a permanency hearing must be within twelve 
months of the child entering foster care. 42 U.S.C. § 675 (2010).  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Honor and apostasy crimes have arrived. They are no longer a distant 
dilemma, but are a reality that Americans are facing across the country. 
They stem from a number of factors, some religious and some not. They 
flourish in communities characterized by control and oppression. These 
closed communities fight against the freedom and openness of the West, the 
liberty promoted through democracy. They embrace violence if necessary 
to promote their beliefs, even violence against their own family members. 
This extremism is in direct opposition to the liberty upon which this country 
was founded, a freedom that protects each individual’s right to choose his 
or her own religion.176  
Communities that embrace fundamentalist Islam are a breeding ground 
for these crimes because they embody all of these characteristics. 
Moreover, there are Islamic scriptures and principles that have been 
interpreted, at least traditionally, to support harming or killing for apostasy 
and cleansing the family for honor.177 While there is a significant amount of 
controversy in regards to whether or not the religion actually authorizes or 
commands these crimes, the trend is made evident that killing for honor or 
apostasy occurs most commonly in fundamentalist Muslim families, 
communities, and countries.178 In fact, the crimes have increased drastically 
in Europe in direct relation to the increase of the Muslim population.179 
European countries are beginning to dialogue on how to best attack the 
prevalence of crimes. For them, the wait is over because too many people 
have been harmed or killed. What was once too culturally sensitive has 
become a top priority.180 Some countries have legislated, some have created 
government agencies, and some have merely begun to track the occurrences 
of the crimes. But, they have begun the fight, and now it is America’s turn.  
America has seen its share of honor killings in recent years, as they have 
become increasingly common. Most recently, America was drawn into the 
story of Rifqa Bary’s conversion from Islam to Christianity, and her 
subsequent escape to find safety from her allegedly threatening parents. 
While her case has been settled privately, her legacy remains: what can a 
                                                                                                                           
 176. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This right is also protected by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which was enacted in 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (2000) and § 6402 (1998). 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 5-9. 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 43-50. 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62. 
 180. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
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state do to protect children from parents whose belief system would tell 
them to harm or kill their child for disobedience or conversion?  
This Comment has presented a discussion of various legal solutions as 
the law exists and has suggested some potential changes to better deal with 
this question. Currently, a state can initiate its temporary removal power to 
extract a child from its home when there is an imminent danger to the child. 
The state agents must take care to follow the state and constitutional 
requirements for due process, which requires notice, hearing and a chance 
to beard.181 But because due process is less stringent for temporary removal 
than for permanent removal, an agent can even interfere without a warrant 
if requiring prior notice and a hearing would put the child in danger.182 This 
presents an opportunity for the state to extract a child when the threat is 
communicated. However, if the threat is not clearly communicated but is 
based on circumstantial evidence, which will likely be the case based on the 
trend exposed in past honor killings, such circumstantial evidence may not 
be enough under our current framework to prove that the threat truly exists.  
While few states can utilize the “course of conduct” test and point to the 
entirety of a parent’s course of conduct that shows the threat exists, many 
states do not have such a statute.183 Even using that test, the search and 
seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Yearning for Zion 
Ranch requires the individualized suspicion that demands more than a 
pervasive belief system of the parents to establish imminent danger.184 The 
state must prove the imposition of the tenets of that belief system upon the 
child in custody.185 Yet, this belief system does not merely impose the 
crime of underage marriage or polygamy, like fundamentalist Mormonism. 
It threatens the death of a child who is determined to live her life in 
accordance with beliefs that differ from her parents. Therefore, the state 
                                                                                                                           
 181. See Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Validity and Application of Statute Allowing 
Endangered Child to be Temporarily Removed from Parental Custody, 38 A.L.R. 756 
(2009). See also In re Willis, 207 S.E.2d 129, 138, 140 (W. Va. 1973) (explaining that the 
Constitution guarantees parents notice and an opportunity to be heard; furthermore, “in order 
to separate a child from its parents on the ground of their unfitness, there must be clear, 
cogent and convincing proof”). 
 182. Temporary removal requires only the preponderance of the evidence, while 
permanent removal requires clear and convincing evidence. See supra text accompanying 
notes 124-125. 
 183. See In re J.J.S., 272 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App. 2008). 
 184. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3652 (Tex. App. May 22, 
2008), aff’d, In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008). 
 185. See supra text accompanying note 146. 
540 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:505 
 
 
should take this threat seriously and truly consider what it can do to protect 
threatened children.  
An effective solution may be to account for such occurrences in the law, 
by giving the state authority to remove a child in the instance that a parent 
who adheres to a fundamentalist belief system would carry out his or her 
beliefs to the extent of harming the child. While our law as it stands gives 
the courts deference to determine whether or not an imminent threat of 
harm exists, the statute may not be enough to sort out these types of threats 
that grow from deep within isolated communities who prefer to avenge 
grievances with crime and without the court system.  
Another alternative may be to grant extended time before a termination 
hearing for cases where the threat of an honor or apostasy crime may be 
present. This would give the state agents an extension to determine the 
probability of the threat and provide an increased protection to the 
threatened child. Regardless of what method a state chooses to employ, 
whether through the law or other means, the state should not avoid the 
realities that these crimes are happening with some regularity, and are likely 
to continue. This was Europe’s position for many years, until governments 
realized that cultural sensitivity is not enough of an excuse to deny the 
existence and prevalence of honor and apostasy crimes.186 To reuse the 
popular maxim, “all that is necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to 
do nothing.”187 
 
                                                                                                                           
 186. See HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 24; EUR. PARL. ASS., supra note 25; and 
Kurdish Human Rights Project, supra note 26. 
 187. Although it is often attributed to English political philosopher, Edmund Burke, its 
source is actually unknown. See Martin Porter, ‘All that is necessary for the triumph of evil 
is that good men do nothing’ (or words to that effect): A Study of Web Quotation, TARTARUS 
(Jan. 2002), http://tartarus.org/~martin/essays/burkequote.html.  
